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Abstract
Increased international competition poses challenges to companies’ organizational 
practices, including human resource management. For multinational companies op-
erating simultaneously in diverse local conditions this challenge implies a decision be-
tween either opting for universal best practices or adapting their employment strategy 
to differing local standards in host countries. What influences whether work practices 
are similar or differ when deployed in differing conditions? Why are some companies 
committed to their workers’ welfare while others are not? This paper attempts to answer 
these questions by studying work practices, namely work systems and fringe benefits, in 
a Dutch multinational company (MNC) and its manufacturing subsidiaries in Western 
and Eastern Europe. Evidence suggests that the observed patterns are best explained by 
the interplay of three factors. Rational economic interest, company values, and local 
institutions yield subsidiary work practices that are embedded in, but not adapted to, 
local standards.  The MNC’s value system accounts for the fact that generous benefits 
are offered without a direct relation to the company’s profit maximization and without 
external societal and institutional pressures to provide such benefits.
Zusammenfassung
Der zunehmende internationale Wettbewerb stellt die Unternehmen speziell im Per-
sonalmanagement vor große Herausforderungen hinsichtlich ihrer organisatorischen 
Praktiken. Multinationale Konzerne, die zur gleichen Zeit unter unterschiedlichen lo-
kalen Bedingungen arbeiten, müssen sich für universelle „best practices“ oder dafür 
entscheiden, ihre Personalpolitik an die verschiedenen lokalen Gegebenheiten anzupas-
sen. Was sind die Einflussfaktoren, die bei diesen Entscheidungen eine Rolle spielen? 
Warum zeigen einige Unternehmen eine hohe soziale Verantwortung für ihr Personal 
und andere nicht? Diese Fragen sollen auf der Basis von Analysen der Produktions- und 
Arbeitsbedingungen und der vom Unternehmen gewährten freiwilligen Zusatzleistun-
gen in einem niederländischen multinationalen Unternehmen mit Niederlassungen in 
West- und Osteuropa beantwortet werden. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die beobachteten 
Muster sich am besten durch ein Zusammenspiel von drei Faktoren erklären lassen: das 
rationale wirtschaftliche Interesse des Unternehmens, sein Wertesystem und die lokalen 
Institutionen. Diese Faktoren fließen in die Produktions- und Arbeitsbedingungen der 
Niederlassungen ein, die zwar in lokale Standards eingebettet, aber nicht an sie ange-
passt sind. Das Wertesystem des multinationalen Unternehmens ist ausschlaggebend 
dafür, dass großzügige Sonderleistungen gewährt werden. Es besteht weder ein direkter 
Zusammenhang mit dem Gewinnmaximierungsziel des Unternehmens, noch sind es 
externe gesellschaftliche oder institutionelle Zwänge, die dieses Verhalten bewirken.
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Introduction
Globalization and intensified transnational competition has led to the introduction of 
a variety of new organizational practices. Especially in large firms, including multina-
tional companies (MNCs), attention to improved company performance is no longer 
limited to the most effective cost management, but involves an interest in developing 
committed and highly performing employees (Jacoby 2005; Dobbin 2005). In relation 
to this, the relevance of work practices that foster sources of creativity and teamwork 
and reward personal initiative has been growing (Dessler 1999; Nolan/O’Donnell 2003). 
Advancing organizational practices beyond labor cost control, modern human resource 
management (HRM) integrates a variety of soft practices that motivate employees and 
look after their social welfare in order to stimulate commitment to company goals. Oth-
er than reflecting overall business goals, evidence confirms that successful implementa-
tion of work practices requires attention to workers’ interests (Peterson 1993), and to 
specific national cultural and organizational aspects in which work practices are ap-
plied (Maurice/Sorge 2000; Michailova 2002).
However, evidence has shown that instead of building close relationships and caring 
for the workforce, a significant number of organizations in the US have moved to mar-
ket-like, distant and transactional relationships with employees (Cappelli 1999; Pfeffer/
Veiga 1999; Pfeffer 2006). In the European context this trend is not as obvious, because 
the utilization of labor and relationships between firms and their employees are to a 
great extent entrenched in long-term employment commitments, consensual work or-
ganization, and institutionalized industrial relations (Ferner/Quintanilla 1998; Bluhm 
2001). Nevertheless, do American developments suggest that European firms, after be-
ing exposed to liberal market conditions, would tend to disembed themselves from their 
commitments?
The above question is particularly relevant for MNCs that operate in different countries 
and simultaneously interact with different institutional settings and actors therein. The 
focus in this paper is on MNCs in Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE), two regions with distinct institutional conditions. MNCs have been success-
fully operating in Central and Eastern Europe for over a decade, and many studies have 
investigated whether they export home-country organizational practices to CEE – a 
region that is more liberal on company practices and thus closer to a liberal market 
economy (Whitley et al. 1997; Danis 2003; Bohle/Greskovits 2004; Meardi 2006).
While not wishing to undermine the explanatory relevance of the firm’s rational strate-
gies and of external societal and institutional influences on adopted work practices, this 
paper highlights yet another important factor in understanding MNC strategies to-
wards employees – company values. The aim is to show how MNC values interact with 
desired profits and competitiveness as well as host-country diversities in Western and 
Eastern Europe. Acknowledging institutional variation in the labor laws, industrial rela-
tion systems and common HRM practices operating in these regions, I document and 
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compare selected work practices (work systems and fringe benefits) in two Western and 
two Eastern European subsidiaries of a Dutch MNC. The findings imply that interac-
tion between rational interest, company values, and local institutions yields workplace 
practices that are embedded in, but not adapted to, local standards. A tight value system 
of the MNC accounts for the fact that generous benefits are offered despite the lack of 
evidence that it pays off for the company’s market success and the lack of external pres-
sures to provide such benefits.
The paper is structured as follows. The first section discusses what particular work prac-
tices are being explored, and the possible explanations that are considered. In the sec-
ond section I provide empirical evidence on work systems and fringe benefits in the 
company subsidiaries studied. The third section compares practices across the subsid-
iaries and relates them to relevant local standards in each case. The fourth section ana-
lyzes potential explanations and induces the overall argument. The fifth section draws 
conclusions.
Conceptualizing work systems, worker welfare and their determinants
A conceptual clarification of the work practices and explanatory processes studied in 
this paper derives from the existing literature. The majority of empirical studies of Eu-
ropean MNCs focus on institutionalized aspects of work practices that are part of a 
formal employment contract (Marsden 1999). These include working time, employ-
ment flexibility, vocational training, wages, and collective bargaining (Gallie et al. 1998; 
Ortiz 1999; Bluhm 2001; Marginson/Meardi 2006; Meardi/Tóth 2006). Such orienta-
tion of the literature leaves less formalized aspects of management-worker interaction 
(i.e. communication and informal distance between managers and workers, company 
commitment to worker welfare, and managerial control) not sufficiently explored at 
the workplace level. Nevertheless, these are equally important for understanding MNC 
behavior and openness to cooperative interaction with workers and worker welfare 
in different local contexts. For this reason, this paper is a comparative study of work 
systems in four subsidiaries of a MNC in Western and Eastern Europe. Work systems 
are distinctive patterns of interconnected characteristics of task organization and con-
trol, workplace relations between social groups, and employment practices and policies 
(Whitley 1999). Relevant work system characteristics are listed in Table 1.
The second aspect of work practices that I investigate concerns non-work-related social 
welfare provisions, or fringe benefits, for workers in the subsidiaries. These supplement 
managerial practices and individual working conditions formalized in an employment 
contract, and they interact with particular types of work system. Through this func-
tion, the benefits contribute to more favorable or less favorable working conditions. For 
workers, generous fringe benefits mean a higher social welfare; for the employer, they 
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Table 1 Work systems
Characteristics
Work system type
Taylorist Delegated responsibility Flexible specialization
negotiated paternalist artisanal patriarchal
Task fragmentation high low low low low
Worker discretion and 
involvement low high considerable high limited
Managerial control over 
work organization high some considerable some high
Separation of managers 
from workers high low variable low high
Employer commitment 
to core workforce low considerable high limited limited
Rewards tied to standardized 
jobs
skills personal per-
formance and 
abilities
skills and  
personal 
evaluation
personal 
evaluation of 
performance
Source: Whitley (1999: 92).
mean higher costs and investments in building commitment to workers. At the same 
time, fringe benefits facilitate worker motivation, participation, commitment to com-
pany goals and organizational efficiency, and they can therefore be beneficial for the 
company also (Heller et al. 1998; Deery/Iverson 2005). Generous fringe benefits tend 
to be offered in paternalistic companies that attempt to achieve their profits and mar-
ket position through a committed workforce (Stoop 1992; Pfeffer 2006). In contrast, a 
company aiming at short-term profit maximization through exploiting workers’ skills 
is reluctant to offer generous benefits (Hyman/Mason 1995; Deery/Iverson 2005). In 
Western Europe, the coordinated market economy secures an extensive institutionaliza-
tion of benefits and thus creates external pressures on companies to provide them (cf. 
Hall/Soskice 2001; Dickmann 2003; Mailand/Due 2004; Meardi 2006). In liberal econo-
mies, including CEE countries, companies are driven to provide benefits on a competi-
tive basis when other firms also provide them. Thus, a great proportion of fringe ben-
efits depends on the market or on a voluntary decision of the company to grant them 
to workers.
The two regions studied show distinct economic and institutional conditions, in terms 
of differing unemployment levels, the position of trade unions, established work pat-
terns, and effective motivation practices (Whitley et al. 1997; Sagie/Koslowsky 2000; 
Meardi 2002; Danis 2003; Michailova 2003; Kohl/Platzer 2004). In the West, workers 
expect long-term employment with set working hours and good working conditions. A 
strong collective representation of worker interests and a collective spirit among West-
ern workers is not as evident in CEE, where workplace competition and the use of per-
formance-related pay are greater. In CEE, probably as a result of economic hardship and 
unemployment since1989, people value their jobs and are willing to accept lower pay 
and worse employment conditions than workers in Western workplaces (Kahancová 
2006). Therefore, CEE presents a more market-driven institutional context for building 
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commitment to workers compared to Western Europe. The empirics reveal whether the 
MNC studied has taken advantage of these differences and adapted to local standards in 
CEE, disembedding itself from its work practices in Western Europe.
In the empirical section of this paper I explore work systems and fringe benefits in four 
MNC subsidiaries in Western and Eastern Europe. Next, I categorize work systems ac-
cording to Table 1 and compare the findings across different subsidiaries as well as with 
the practices common locally in each host country. In an attempt to explain company 
behavior in relation to work systems and fringe benefits, I investigate three possible 
explanations. First, I discuss the company’s rational economic strategy of diffusing best 
practices in search of international competition and profitability (Martin/Beaumont 
1998; Paauwe/Boselie 2005). Second, I question the influence of local conditions and 
institutional constraints on MNC behavior (Maurice/Sorge/Warner 1981; Luthans/
Marsnik/Luthans 1997; Ferner/Quintanilla 1998; Maurice/Sorge 2000). Third, I pay at-
tention to MNC values and beliefs about a socially accepted way of running a company 
that may alter managerial behavior towards workers regardless of the business strategy 
and external constraints (Bartlett/Ghoshal 2002; Pfeffer 2006).
First, in a rational economic perspective, a company is expected to subordinate all its 
actions to its single goal of profitability (Turner 1991). This means having clearly struc-
tured preferences and implementing best work practices that are exogenous to the local 
social context in which company behavior takes place (Rubery/Grimshaw 2003: 28). A 
consideration of costs, including those of fringe benefits and other work practices, is 
central in the decision about company behavior. An implication for work practices is 
that they should be similar across the MNC subsidiaries if this is relevant for the com-
pany’s business strategy. Cappelli (1999) argued that the striving for global competi-
tiveness in companies is the main factor accountable for the requirement to lower costs, 
including labor costs and thus worker benefits. Deriving from this argument, generous 
benefits and worker participation in management decision-making are provided only if 
they directly improve profitability (Sagie/Koslowsky 2000; Deery/Iverson 2005).
Second, local societal and institutional pressures, or local isomorphism, are counter-
vailing forces to the company’s universal rational economic strategy driving subsidiary 
work practices. Instead of opting for universal best practices, local factors constrain 
MNCs and encourage them to behave like other employers in a given host-country en-
vironment (Ferner/Quintanilla 1998). External local influences thus push the MNC to 
adapt to standard practices in a given society and institutional setting (Maurice/Sorge/
Warner 1981; Dore 1991; Streeck 1992; Soskice 2000). This implies that the MNC will 
adopt work systems and fringe benefits similar to other companies in Western and East-
ern European contexts. In other words, European MNCs maintain their commitment 
in Western Europe because of institutional pressures; in CEE, they are expected to foster 
a market-like relationship to workers with fewer non-wage benefits, buying labor for 
money in an exchange that can be terminated by either side for any or no reason (Pfef-
fer 2005: 8).
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The third possible explanation of work practices and related company behavior are 
company values, defined as broad tendencies to prefer certain states of affairs over oth-
ers (Hofstede 1981). Values are formed in a path-dependent administrative heritage 
of doing things in an organization (Bartlett/Ghoshal 2002) and can therefore account, 
independently of the company’s economic goals, for the decision whether to build 
commitment to workers via work systems and benefits or to leave workers out of the 
organization’s boundaries and develop a more exploitative and market-like relationship 
(Williamson 1975; Pfeffer 2006).
In the analysis I evaluate the explanatory relevance of the factors outlined for observed 
work systems and fringe benefits. Other than focusing on each explanatory factor in-
dividually, I elaborate the link between rational business interest and company values, 
values and local conditions, and the business interest and local conditions. The aim is 
to identify which of these factors are important, and how exactly they matter for MNC 
behavior towards workers through work systems and fringe benefits.
Evidence for this paper has been collected in Electra,1 a leading Dutch MNC in the elec-
tronics sector. The company was established in late nineteenth century and experienced 
a gradual expansion abroad. It maintains its long-term reputation of responsiveness to 
local conditions, especially in HRM decentralization (Dronkers 1975). I focus on the 
work systems and fringe benefits of production workers in four Electra factories located 
in Belgium (hereafter EBE), France (hereafter EFR), Poland (hereafter EPL) and Hun-
gary (hereafter EHU). These factories are among the key employers in relevant local 
conditions and are comparable in their products, position within the MNC’s corporate 
structure, and relation with headquarters. Despite the presence of expatriates in man-
agement, all HR managers were locals. Case study methodology involved 114 detailed 
face-to-face interviews with managers and employee representatives (trade unions and 
works councils) in the factories, at the headquarters in each host country, and at corpo-
rate headquarters.
Work systems and fringe benefits in Western and Eastern Europe
The similarity of the factories studied, because they are all part of one MNC, produce 
similar products and have a similar strategy for wages and employment flexibility, on 
the one hand, and the differing host-country laws, industrial relations systems and local 
work conventions, on the other, allow us to control for corporate influences and, at the 
same time, explore MNC behavior towards production workers under various condi-
tions. EBE is located in a highly industrialized region with many employment oppor-
tunities. EFR benefits from the region’s relatively high unemployment and availability 
1  The name of the company is a pseudonym.
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of temporary agency workers. EPL’s conditions are characterized by very high levels 
of unemployment (affecting mainly unskilled workers) despite the presence of several 
MNCs and thus job opportunities. EHU faces a tight labor market, which forces the 
factory to develop innovative ways to secure workers’ commitment.
An analysis of interview information and company documents reveals that the factories 
demonstrate both similarities and differences in work system characteristics (see Table 2).
Table 2 Work systems in Electra factories
Characteristics EBE EFR EPL EHU
Task fragmentation low low low high
Worker discretion high high high low
Direct managerial control  
over work organization considerable considerable low high
Separation/segmentation  
between managers and workers low low low low
Employer commitment  
to core workforce
high; some-
what perfor-
mance based
high;  
performance 
based
high;  
performance 
based
high;  
performance 
based
Basis for reward allocation job, skills,  
quality and  
collective  
performance
job, skills,  
quality and 
collective per-
formance
short/long-term 
individual and 
collective  
performance 
and abilities 
short/long-term 
individual and 
collective per-
formance and 
abilities
Source: Author’s analysis according to Whitley (1999).
All factories share a flat work organization with low separation between managers and 
workers. They also encourage training and declare commitment to a well-perform-
ing workforce based on workers’ performance evaluations. Great attention is paid to 
developing worker competencies and identifying key functional areas and individual 
worker abilities. Managers maintain that direct interaction with workers is crucial for 
factory performance and productivity, and that factories can only compete through 
their people, not through their technology. Still, what matters here is not merely the 
idea of making factories profitable, but the means of achieving profitability. Evidence 
shows that profitability and thus rational economic behavior is mediated by particular 
local conditions, company values, and the values of individual managers. A particular 
managerial attitude is intrinsic in both formal and informal work practices (i.e. com-
munication styles, motivation, and informal interaction at the shop floor). In line with 
company values, Electra’s managers do not aim at straightforward domination and ex-
ploitation of the workforce, but at an alignment of workers’ values with company values. 
This takes place via increasing the workers’ beliefs that they are important for the firm.2 
2 This managerial attitude applies to all kinds of production workers – whether permanent, tem-
porary or hired through a temporary labor agency. Of course, long-term interaction between 
permanent workers and managers yields more personal knowledge and thus possibly a closer 
relationship; however, managers do not discriminate against temporary and agency workers in 
their interaction. In fringe benefits, some discrimination exists (as discussed below).
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Daily interaction between managers and workers is an essential part of the strategy to 
build interactive work relations as the HRM officer from EBE documented:
The relation is formal and friendly. We are not friends; it is business. But it is not so that there 
is a strict hierarchy … blue-collars can speak directly to [the managers]. We encourage open 
communication, but it is still business wise [i.e. businesslike, note by author] … It is not the 
intention to have friends here, I think you should avoid that, because otherwise you cannot do 
proper [work].3
A deeper examination of factory operation through open interaction with workers re-
veals that company values are central for determining the way that Electra has chosen 
to achieve profits. A quote from EPL’s manager illustrates this point:4
My HR manager … said, “Nobody works for Electra; you only work for your boss.” That’s true. 
If you look up to your boss and you have a lot of respect for him, he has been very good to you 
and you have been very good to him and the communication works there, if he comes to you 
and says “I would like you to work an extra hour today,” you would be much happier to do it 
than if you have a very bad relationship and you have some kind of dictator walking along the 
production line.
The observed low separation between workers and managers has not been imposed by 
Electra’s corporate headquarters, but has emerged as a consequence of Electra’s values 
responding to local cultures and perception of hierarchies. In EFR the hierarchy be-
tween the worker and his/her boss common to French work systems is maintained and 
communication is more formal, whereas in EBE the workers call their managers by their 
first name. A similar situation exists in EHU, in line with common practice in Hungary, 
of calling each other by their first name and maintaining informal relationships despite 
existing hierarchies. In line with general Polish work practices, the hierarchy in EPL is 
maintained, but people generally agree right away to call each other by their first name 
and communicate informally. This applies especially to managers and workers in daily 
contact.
Aside from the similarities outlined, the factories diverge in several aspects of work 
system. Although several practices are of corporate origin, their implementation dif-
fers greatly in response to local conditions and worker mentalities. The most important 
differences apply to financial employee motivation. Allocation of rewards is linked to 
performance differently in each factory,5 and competition between workers is fostered 
3 Interview date 2004/10/13.
4 Interview date 2004/04/21.
5 Financial motivation is extensively used in CEE, but not in Western factories. In the West, soft 
motivating factors, i.e. delegated responsibility, open communication, attracting workers to 
company developments, or the possibility of reverse appraisals (workers’ feedback to immedi-
ate supervisors) tend to be more successful. The influence of trade unions also constrains the 
use of performance pay in Western Europe. In CEE, soft motivating factors are also used but are 
effectively combined with financial motivation.
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in the CEE sites but not in Western sites. In this respect, a clear East-West division in 
Electra’s behavior is observed.
The findings also document differences that do not relate to an East-West pattern but, 
instead, to individual factory differences: for instance, between the Hungarian factory 
and the other plants in relation to task fragmentation, and between the Polish factory 
and others in terms of managerial control over work organization and trade union in-
volvement in communication between the employer and workers. First, the reason for 
workers’ extensive freedom over their tasks in EPL is that managers perceive the work-
force to be highly educated and skilled and thus able to shoulder individual responsibil-
ity. A larger workforce in EHU, compared to other factories, complicates extensive dele-
gated responsibility on a scale similar to EPL. Second, managerial control over work or-
ganization tends to be lower in business systems with strong trade unions, as in Belgium 
and France. However, in the case of Electra the unions have not been strong enough to 
decrease managerial control, which has led to the condition that Electra’s work systems 
in Western subsidiaries differ from the HR practices and work systems generally found 
in these countries. The only factory where managerial control over work tasks is low is 
EPL. External societal and trade union influences do not account for this fact, because 
in EPL, and in Poland in general, unions are structurally the weakest of all the cases 
studied (Kahancová/Meer 2006).
What do the above findings suggest about overall work system patterns in the factories 
investigated? Although none can be directly associated with Taylorism, delegated re-
sponsibility, or flexible specialization, all Electra factories more or less fit a delegated re-
sponsibility work system with elements of paternalism. This confirms earlier evidence 
that paternalism towards workers has been an inherent feature of Electra’s corporate 
values over decades (Meer 2000; Stoop 1992). In line with paternalist values, Electra 
emphasizes the importance of worker satisfaction and social welfare. In its home coun-
try (the Netherlands), Electra has long been perceived as a social employer offering 
well-paid jobs, employment security, housing, health care, education and socio-cultural 
services for employees (Stoop 1992; Meer 2000).6 In line with earlier findings, my evi-
dence on fringe benefits (see Table 3) confirms that paternalist values are more than a 
formal part of the company’s public relations and corporate social responsibility; and 
the company implements the declared purposes.
Workers’ benefits can be divided in two categories: practices aiming at increasing mate-
rial wellbeing, and practices to foster recognition of personal qualities and to demon-
strate Electra’s interest in workers’ fair treatment in work-related matters and personal 
and social interests. Electra’s fringe benefits are not coordinated across the factories 
studied or in conjunction with corporate headquarters, but are exclusively local, in some 
6 In 2003 Electra was ranked the number-one sustainable company in the Dow Jones Sustain-
ability Index in its sector (Electra 2004).
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cases developed or negotiated with local unions and factory works councils.7 Tempo-
rary workers hired through an agency are somewhat discriminated against where the 
provision of the listed benefits is concerned.8
Table 3 Fringe benefits in Electra factories
Benefit EBE EFR EPL EHU
New Year’s day breakfast, lunch or drink x x
Recognition of workers’ personal achievements  
(i.e. additional diploma or certificate in areas of personal interest) x
Santa Claus event (and gifts for workers and/or for their children) x x x
Women’s day event (flowers for female workers) x
Christmas presents, also for temporary workers x x x
Integration and team-building parties, sponsored team trips x x
Discovery day – open day for visitors  
(workers’ families, potential recruits) x x
Long-service recognition, i.e. upon retirement  
(EBE: TV setsa, EFR: work medal, EHU: thank-you note, refreshments) x x x
Volunteer firemen recognition day x
Medical care services (EHU), extra-legal medical insurance (EFR) x x
Sickness supplement, income supplement in the event of death x x
Electra-sponsored insurance for non-work-related accidents x
Psychologist (2 days/week) x
Loans with 0% interest (EFR), housing loans (EHU) x x
Personnel shop or discount vouchers for Electra products x x x x
Soccer and cinema tickets (EBE), holiday checks (EHU) x x
Frequent competitions and drawings to win Electra products x
Electra-sponsored summer outdoor social and cultural events  
for workers and their families x x
Free parking for workers (in EBE, a union-stipulated walking bonus  
for parking in distant parking places) x x
Contracted bus service for workers (EHU), agreement with public  
transport authority to adjust bus schedules to Electra’s shifts (EPL) x x
a Rewarding retired workers with a TV set has been a tradition in EBE for many years. Given the grow-
ing costs of production of flat-screen TV sets and following an agreement with trade unions, this 
practice no longer exists.
Most of the documented fringe benefits do not directly relate to workers’ performance 
on the job and thus to factory performance. Instead, building on company paternalism, 
they primarily aim at improving workers’ social welfare, which may vary in different 
7 Such as the 2004 Open Day in EBE and the annual summer outdoor events in EPL.
8 In EBE and EFR, agency workers are, legally, not Electra employees and therefore do not receive 
benefits that Electra provides to its regular employees. In EHU, temporary workers and agency 
workers are discriminated against in terms of receiving holiday vouchers or any long-service 
recognition, while the company’s meal voucher contribution is reduced. Discrimination is least 
extensive in EPL; this factory does not hire agency workers and thus all workers are Electra em-
ployees with full rights to fringe benefits.
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countries. They involve costs for the company, but their effect on profits and organiza-
tional performance is unknown in advance. For this reason, I maintain that the benefits 
provided have a broader aim than facilitating company profits and universal rationality 
in company behavior. Of course, Electra’s fundamental goal is to maximize profits, but 
the means of achieving profits are endogenous and influenced by company values and 
responsiveness to different workers’ interests in different countries.
In sum, evidence shows that Electra has opted for an open relationship towards its 
workers and for rather generous fringe benefits regardless of factory location. Apart 
from this broadly understood similarity, several differences apply to the work systems 
and fringe benefits studied. An evaluation of this evidence – based on a comparison 
across the four factories, and between the factories and their respective local condi-
tions – follows next.
How different are Electra’s factories from each other and from local stand ards 
in work practices?
In the past twenty years of corporate development, which have included severe reor-
ganizations and job losses, Electra has continued to maintain its paternalistic admin-
istrative heritage as long as this does not clash with corporate economic interests, thus 
balancing the need for profits and efficiency with company values. In this respect, my 
findings confirm the company’s attempt to diffuse several work system attributes as best 
practices that assure workers’ compliance with company values across different coun-
tries. These include the willingness to delegate authority, flat hierarchies, open com-
munication, informal social relations between managers and workers, and attention to 
workers’ social welfare. Nevertheless, Electra understands that successful practices in 
one case may not have the same effect on performance in other cases due to different 
institutional and cultural factors, which generates differences in work practices across 
the factories studied. Variation is found predominantly in reward allocation (collective 
in Western factories and individual in CEE factories), the types and extent of fringe 
benefits, and the use of financial motivation. Variation in these work system elements 
corroborates the view that paternalism in Electra is not directly diffused across orga-
nizational units and that direct involvement of corporate headquarters in factory work 
systems is limited.
An evaluation of these similarities and differences in work systems reveals that a dif-
fusion of best practices is indeed taking place. The MNC has a central role in shaping 
local work practices via this diffusion process. At the same time, work systems differ 
from each other in a variety of aspects, in which they are responsive to and embedded 
in local conditions. The local responsiveness is an inherent feature of Electra’s company 
values. Therefore, work systems in Electra’s factories are best described as an outcome 
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of a hybridization process that draws on corporate goals and values, the utilization of 
differing local conditions, and the values of individual subsidiary managers (cf. Boyer 
et al. 1998; Meardi/Tóth 2006).
Hybridization in work systems is not mirrored in fringe benefits. A corporate design 
of benefits for production workers is not in place, and each factory’s benefits are fully 
responsive to local standards. Interestingly, we cannot speak about Electra’s adaptation 
to local work practices – especially in CEE, where Electra’s benefits, and work practices 
in general, tend to exceed local standards. In terms of costs and managerial creativity, 
fringe benefits are relatively more extensive in CEE factories than in Western factories. 
This goes against expectations of profit-driven and exploitative behavior on the part of 
a MNC in low-wage countries and of market-driven conditions in CEE. There are sev-
eral explanations for this situation. First, the maturity of Western factories, the stability 
of host-country institutions, labor market dynamics, and strong unions account for 
wage stability, predictable working conditions and, to a certain extent, job security. The 
effect of extensive fringe benefits on worker motivation is more limited than in CEE 
countries, which reduces the tendency to use such benefits. Second, Western Electra fac-
tories face higher labor costs and therefore increased budget constraints in organizing 
social events. Third, because fringe benefits are not corporately determined, their extent 
depends on the values and interests of local managements as well as on local conditions, 
including welfare states and trade union strength. The business success of the EBE fac-
tory is attributed to the strong task orientation of its general manager at the expense 
of a modest human orientation. In EPL and EHU, managers are more people-oriented 
than task-oriented, and their personal values are transposed to the extent and type of 
fringe benefits provided. Finally, working conditions in Eastern European factories are 
more demanding when compared to Western factories (i.e. longer working hours, a 
higher number of shifts, lower wages) and, in line with company values, Electra aims at 
compensating for tough working conditions with generous benefits.
When contrasting Electra’s work practices with common patterns in each host country, 
similarities and differences are found yet again. Electra’s work system in EBE diverges 
from other evidence on Belgian work practices (Hees 1995) through its high worker 
discretion, extensive communication and feedback, low separation between managers 
and workers, flat hierarchy, and lack of interference from headquarters in workplace or-
ganization. However, EBE fits the Belgian pattern in its considerable managerial control 
and the non-existence of financial involvement and performance-related pay.
In contrast to common French practices, EFR is far from a Taylorist work system, with 
strict workplace hierarchies and formal relations (Maurice/Sorge/Warner 1981: 84; 
Brunstein 1995). According to French Electra managers, EFR has better internal rela-
tions than locally comparable companies, where employees report considerable pres-
sure and relations are problematic partly because of authoritarian management styles. 
Electra is close to general French practices in fostering teamwork, training, and modest 
competition via performance-related benefits. Evidence on fringe benefits from EFR 
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does not confirm Brunstein’s findings that MNC behavior in France lacks social sensi-
tivity towards workers and only aims at achieving profit at any costs (Brunstein 1995).
EPL shows a more positive picture of HRM in Poland than that documented by studies 
of Polish practices (Sagie/Koslowsky 2000; Kohl/Platzer 2004). The personal values of 
Electra’s managers lead to extensive fringe benefits, teambuilding beyond the workplace 
via social events, and relatively good working conditions despite tough working time 
and job insecurity. This enhances Electra’s reputation as an attractive place to work, and 
deepens the gap between Electra’s and other local companies’ work systems and fringe 
benefits.
Work system characteristics of Electra’s Hungarian factory suggest a local influence on 
high managerial control and less mobility between positions, but this is related to the 
large size of the workforce. Electra differs from Hungarian standards in its relatively 
generous benefits, its practices of employee participation, and its institutionalization 
of performance evaluations (Whitley et al. 1997). According to my respondents, work-
ers appreciate Electra’s performance pay, fringe benefits, communication and informal 
interaction with managers irrespective of the local labor market situation.9
In sum, findings on work systems and fringe benefits in four Electra factories suggest 
neither a full-fledged corporate diffusion of best practices with the purpose of efficiency 
and profit seeking, nor their extensive adaptation to local standards with the same pur-
pose. Work practices are constructed both from best practices and locally unique prac-
tices and thus referred to as hybridization. Going beyond this conclusion, it is appealing 
to analyze what factors account for the observed patterns, and what implications can 
be generally drawn for firm behavior and commitment towards workers in differing 
institutional conditions. The next section offers such an analysis.
Accounting for observed patterns
What accounts for observed work system characteristics and the generosity of fringe 
benefits? How does the influence of local conditions and of corporate paternalist values 
alter Electra’s universal rational economic behavior (based on profit drive and inter-
national competitiveness and efficiency)? In explaining work practices across different 
countries and MNC factories, the existing literature has drawn mainly on the compa-
ny’s rational economic goals and the influence of local conditions. Apart from these two 
factors, I also study the influence of paternalist corporate values. I first investigate these 
explanatory factors one by one.
9 Being located in a tight labor market, EHU has to fight harder for skilled workers than EPL.
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A rational economic perspective on Electra’s behavior towards workers suggests that the 
firm would invest in building commitment to workers and offering generous benefits 
only if this led to increased profits (Sagie/Koslowsky 2000; Deery/Iverson 2005). Evi-
dence in this paper does not directly support this claim, but suggests looking closer at 
the means of achieving rational behavior. Profit-related measures in employment con-
ditions include extensive employment flexibility in Electra’s subsidiaries. These mea-
sures are central for optimizing employment, production and market demands, but 
at the same time they bring increased costs for the MNC in terms of managing the 
flexibility itself. And, even more importantly, by following exclusively a profit goal in a 
short-term perspective, Electra would not be motivated to offset flexibility with gener-
ous benefits, reward workers for personal achievements, and emphasize informal social 
interaction at the shop floor. Obviously, the purpose of these practices is to raise a moti-
vated and committed workforce, but when Electra’s decision to foster such practices has 
been taken, their future effects on profits have not been known to management. Neither 
does the company conduct studies and carry out benchmarking against competitors on 
whether such behavior actually improves profitability.10 Therefore, I argue that profit 
and efficiency drives alone are not a sufficient explanatory factor of the work practices 
described.
This argument does not render profit and efficiency considerations unimportant in 
MNC behavior and commitment to workers’ welfare. In the past thirty years, Electra 
underwent several major reorganizations in response to increased global competi-
tion mainly from Asian producers. These restructurings brought a reconsideration of 
Electra’s assets and core competencies, and greater transparency in the organization’s 
functioning, but they also had severe consequences for employment. The number of 
jobs for production workers considerably decreased, especially in Western Europe. In 
some cases, temporary or agency workers replaced permanent workers. Thus, in issues 
of strategic importance, efficiency and profit are the firm’s priority. But as long as the 
broader framework of rational behavior induced by sharp international competition al-
lows it, Electra will attempt to achieve its business goals in a socially responsible way, i.e. 
by treating the workers currently employed in the factories in a humane way and offer-
ing them generous benefits. Electra believes that it is this kind of HRM that constitutes 
the best means to achieve profitability. This holds despite the fact that blue-collar work-
ers are not strategically important (anymore) and the company’s core competencies are 
shifting from production to research and development.
Beyond the firm’s rational behavior, what other factors explain the observed work prac-
tices? Do external conditions and actors create pressures on MNCs to comply with ex-
isting institutionalized practices or to increase the firm’s societal legitimacy (Hiss 2006)? 
The impact of local societal and institutional factors on Electra’s subsidiaries is exten-
sive not only because they exert constraints on firm behavior (Streeck 1997), but also 
10 Source: internal documents and discussion with Electra headquarters HRM manager, 
2006/09/28.
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because they create institutional spaces and opportunities in which the MNC embeds 
itself in order to find the optimal way of functioning in diverse conditions (Sellier 2000; 
Maurice/Sorge 2000). Electra recognizes the impact of host-country conditions, both 
national and local, and reflects them in a decentralized HRM strategy. Already in the 
early 1970s, the company was well known for its responsiveness to differing local condi-
tions:
In our experience, national management initiative is the best way of ensuring the flexibility and 
adaptability necessary in widely varying circumstances. This particularly holds true for person-
nel and industrial relations policies, which have to follow national legislation … and to fit into 
the national labor market situation and industrial relations structure and climate as well as take 
into account national characteristics and preferences. (Dronkers 1975: 166)
If societal and institutional effects do constrain Electra’s behavior and lead to work prac-
tices that resemble those of other local companies, the findings would indicate extensive 
similarities between the factories studied and the general HRM practices in the host 
countries. However, as shown above, such a wide-ranging adaptation of Electra’s behav-
ior to local practices has not been documented. Especially the findings in CEE factories 
are puzzling, because Electra’s way of treating workers and the generosity of fringe ben-
efits exceed local standards. The quality of working conditions in CEE, and collective 
labor representation to induce such a quality, differ greatly from Western Europe. Due 
to economic hardship and the uncertainty of employment, workers value their jobs and 
fulfill almost any management requests. A strong institutional framework, i.e. the legal 
stipulations and a system of collective bargaining to facilitate workers’ welfare, is absent 
(Mailand/Due 2004; Avdagic 2005; Meardi 2006). Therefore, Electra is not under host-
country institutional pressures to offer generous benefits and above-average working 
conditions. Societal pressures, i.e. benchmarking work practices against other locally 
established firms, and local fashions in management practices (Abrahamson 1996; Pfef-
fer 2006) that would force Electra to adapt to local standards, are not extensive either. 
The local environment is relatively conducive to the exploitative treatment of workers 
by MNCs. Had Electra been pushed to adapt to local practices because of external in-
fluences (legislation, trade unions, market pressures, and common work practices in 
locally established firms), flat hierarchies and attention to worker welfare would have 
been less evident than documented. Regardless of these conditions, Electra maintained 
its Western European commitment to offer better work practices than other local em-
ployers and even some MNCs.11 Therefore, neither Electra’s rational profit strategy nor 
external pressures on company behavior originating in host-country societies alone 
account for the observed patterns of work practices in the factories studied.
A full understanding of Electra’s behavior necessitates the inclusion of the third ex-
planatory factor – company values. In Electra, paternalist values have continuously 
shaped company actions in the transnational and local contexts since the company’s 
11 Source: interviews with representatives of local governments and labor market authorities in 
Poland and Hungary (2004–2005); local newspaper clippings.
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establishment in the late nineteenth century and its gradual expansion abroad in the 
early twentieth century. The values relate to a common understanding within the MNC 
about how certain processes are best dealt with, and at what level of the organization 
(Bartlett/Ghoshal 2002). Electra’s paternalism is based on two central factors: the char-
ismatic leadership of the early company leaders, and local religious and power struggles 
during Electra’s initial years in the Dutch countryside (Stoop 1992). The combination 
of these factors has led to a personnel and social policy that is specific to the organiza-
tion, and thus more than an outcome of home-country isomorphism (Ferner/Quinta-
nilla 1998).
Paternalist values originated in the company’s early attempt to pacify the organized 
labor movement in the Netherlands. Later these values were strengthened by Electra’s 
leadership after exposure to the great economic depression in the 1930s, and by at-
tempts to maintain the company’s functioning and thus protect jobs during the Sec-
ond World War. Drawing on such actions, a company-specific tight system of values 
was gradually strengthened and permeated managerial thinking from headquarters to 
foreign subsidiaries. The selection and training of managers is an important process in 
maintaining the continuity of this value system. Instead of imposing corporate values 
on local managers, the company recruits managers whose individual values match the 
company’s values. These managers are then granted large autonomy from headquarters 
to pursue their local actions. In other words, the tightly coupled value system of Elec-
tra is balanced with a loose implementation system in differing local contexts. Thus, a 
combination of Electra’s corporate paternalism and its responsiveness to local condi-
tions, i.e. work habits, welfare provisions, and local employment standards, cannot be 
neglected in the explanation of work practices in diverse East-West settings.
The above analysis shows that values do interact with the company’s profit endeavor 
and international competitiveness as well as with differing local conditions in which 
work practices are deployed. Values are simultaneously anchored in a particular organi-
zational culture and particular local conditions. A combination of these gives concrete 
meanings to values and their relation to rational company behavior. I now discuss the 
interaction of economic goals, values, and local conditions.
Electra’s economic behavior – the drive towards global efficiency and profit – has put 
company values under pressure. However, instead of evading earlier paternalism, Elec-
tra continuously seeks to balance its economic interest with its established values. Even 
if the company would attempt to disembed itself from its value system, this is not easy 
because the values are institutionalized and form a path-dependent administrative her-
itage of a firm (Bartlett/Ghoshal 2002). Instead of trade-offs between business interests 
and values, Electra attempts to balance these and avoid potential clashes. Values shape 
the company’s perception of what is rational and how to achieve economic rationality 
in differing conditions. As a result, Electra’s reorganizations have brought an improve-
ment in profits and competitiveness and at the same time signaled a continuity of com-
pany values. Of course, ultimately any company action is profit-driven, but in decisions 
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whether or not to achieve profits by including workers’ interests, Electra has opted to 
do so. Regardless of concrete expectations of higher profits, managers have maintained 
their concern about workers’ welfare and the belief that people value good working 
relations and are more willing to expend extra effort when they are psychologically con-
nected to their company (Pfeffer 2005: 6). In other words, company values became the 
means of achieving profit, and at the same time they account for positive externalities 
of the company’s rational behavior to the benefit of workers.
Aside from balancing economic behavior with paternalist values towards workers, the 
company attempts to balance its profit goals with responsiveness to different social and 
institutional conditions in the host countries. Electra headquarters in host countries 
have always enjoyed great decision-making powers. Corporate reorganizations aimed 
at improving economic performance have not led to a centralization of such powers at 
corporate headquarters, but have facilitated further decentralization and site autonomy. 
This is not the result of Electra’s inability to centralize decisions, but the company’s 
belief that the factory is the optimal organizational level for managing local resources, 
in particular work issues in different countries. A decentralized HRM aims to better 
reflect the needs of each factory and its workforce and to decide the factories’ strategic 
role within the corporate structure (cf. Kristensen/Zeitlin 2005). In other words, Electra 
has combined the search for best economic performance with attention to host-country 
diversity. The fact that the company itself is willing to develop different work practices 
in different countries eliminates the tension between a universal rational strategy and 
the constraints of differing local institutions.
Finally, an interactive relationship exists between company values and local conditions. 
A tight value system in an MNC can create tensions in the implementation of these val-
ues, especially if they are not consistent with values, work attitudes and standards prev-
alent in particular local conditions. To avoid such tension, Electra’s responsiveness to 
diverse conditions encompasses a loose and decentralized system of transposing com-
pany values to actual work practices in the factories. Selection of managers who run 
the factories’ work affairs autonomously but in line with corporate values is the most 
obvious evidence of how Electra combines corporate paternalism with local respon-
siveness in its foreign subsidiaries. Consequently, corporate paternalism is maintained 
but acquires different meanings across different socio-economic contexts, and leads to 
different work practices and fringe benefits in different countries and local conditions.
In sum, an explanation of work systems and fringe benefits in Electra’s factories needs 
to account for the interplay of all three explanatory factors discussed, even though the 
existing literature has treated them separately. I have shown how corporately deter-
mined paternalist values interact with the MNC’s rational economic behavior as well 
as host-country institutional and societal diversities in Western and Eastern Europe. 
An outcome of this interactive process is work practices that are neither diffused from 
headquarters nor adapted to local standards, but are still embedded in particular local 
conditions. Diverse local conditions are used as a resource for achieving international 
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economic competitiveness, and for developing concrete meanings of the paternalist val-
ues of the MNC. Although work practices differ in several aspects, generous benefits 
and an open management-workforce interaction exist regardless of local standards in 
Western European and CEE conditions.
Conclusions
This paper discusses work systems and fringe benefits in a Dutch MNC and its subsid-
iaries in Western and Eastern Europe, and provides an analysis of observed findings and 
company behavior in relation to this. All subsidiaries, despite being located in different 
countries, roughly fit a paternalist work system. However, the implementation of pa-
ternalist work practices is not coordinated in the MNC but responsive to local diversi-
ties. In those aspects of work practices where MNC goals are independent from local 
conditions or local conditions are similar and therefore facilitate similar practices, the 
company has opted for diffusion of best practices. In aspects where the firm perceives 
local conditions to play an important role for its rational economic behavior, the MNC 
has utilized local differences to develop subsidiary-specific aspects of work systems and 
fringe benefits. Thus, the work practices documented are an outcome of hybridization 
between corporate best practices and MNC responsiveness (not necessarily adaptation) 
to local labor markets and work habits across European countries (Meardi/Tóth 2006; 
Boyer et al. 1998).
An explanation of company behavior in relation to studied work practices interlinks 
three factors: the MNC’s rational economic interest, company values, and local condi-
tions. The mutual influence of these factors yields work practices that are embedded 
in, but not adapted to, local standards in Western and Eastern Europe. A paternalist 
value system of the MNC studied accounts for an open relationship towards workers 
and rather generous fringe benefits regardless of subsidiary location, and gives concrete 
meanings to the MNC’s rational behavior to maximize profits. The paper argues that 
a system of company values modifies company behavior in such a way that it does not 
comply with a universal rational expectation, nor with adaptation to local diversities 
due to institutional pressures. Thus, rationality is endogenous to values and differing 
local conditions.
Returning to the concern raised in the introduction, the main motivation to study com-
pany behavior vis-à-vis workers in coordinated and liberal market conditions was to 
discover whether companies hold to their commitments even when moving from co-
ordinated to liberal conditions, and what their actions mean for workers’ welfare. The 
implication of my argument is as follows. Critical of an economic logic, companies do 
not automatically disembed themselves from their commitments to workers’ welfare 
in order to save costs and pursue universal profit-driven behavior. Rational behavior is 
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endogenous and thus can involve voluntary commitment to providing worker welfare 
and favorable working conditions. For this reason, a strong institutional framework is 
not necessary to maintain companies’ commitment to workers’ welfare. The paper has 
shown that these implications hold only if the company’s internal value system is firmly 
established and facilitates voluntary self-constraint regarding universal rational action 
on the part of the company. Alternatively, if company values facilitate arm’s-length rela-
tions to workers, interest in their exploitation, and short-term profit maximization, the 
external institutional framework can inhibit this kind of company behavior, but not 
eliminate it. All in all, attention has to be paid to company values and the influence of 
institutions that mediate rational company behavior towards workers.
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